North Dakota Law Review
Volume 50

Number 2

Article 8

1973

Selected Environmental Law Aspects of the Garrison Diversion
Project
Robert L. Manley
Jeffrey J. Peterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Manley, Robert L. and Peterson, Jeffrey J. (1973) "Selected Environmental Law Aspects of the Garrison
Diversion Project," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol50/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

NOTE

SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ASPECTS
OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION PROJECT

INTRODUCTION:

I.

GARRISON DIVERSION PROJECT

The historical origins of irrigation are ancient and diverse.:
"The operation of watering lands for agricultural purposes by artificial means ' 2 was carried out by the ancient Egyptians, Mesopotamians, Chinese, Incas and Aztecs well before the birth of Christ.s
The decay of ancient irrigation is often associated with the collapse
of civilizations; however, historians are not in agreement as to
which is cause and which is effect.4 In relation to this, it is interesting to note that several areas subject to intensive irrigation in ancient periods are now unfit for agriculture due to soil salinization.5
This occurs when excess salts in irrigation water are left behind
in the soil. Salinization inhibits plant growth by preventing water
from reaching root systems, by chemically depriving plants of nutrients, and by outright poisoning. 6
Early irrigation efforts -in the Imperial Valley of California
encountered substantial difficulties with salinization, but modern
drainage methods have achieved a favorable salt balance in recent
years.7 Some questions have been raised in relation to the possibili8
ty of salinization by Garrison Diversion irrigation waters, but
BIRKET-SMITH, THE PATHS OF CULTURE 155-56 (1965); C. DARLINGTON, THE
1.
See K.
EVOLUTION OF MAN AND SOCIETY 85-86 (1969).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
3. C. DARLINGTON, sIupra note 1.
4. A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 44-48 (1946); Brown, Human Food Production as

a Process in the Biosphere, 221 SCI. Am.163 (Sept. 1963).
5. Revelle, Water, 209 ScI. Am.102-01 (Sept. 1963).
6. 1 I. HOUK, IRRIGATION ENGINEERING 456, 475 (1951).
7. E. COAPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 75-76 (1968).
8.

G. SHERWOOD, NEW WOUNDS FOR OLD PRAIRIES 48-49 (1972).
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the Bureau of Reclamation has indicated that plans for the project
include measures to avoid this difficulty. 9
The feasibility of a Garrison Diversion type canal to transfer
irrigation water from the Missouri River to the Red River of
the North drainage basin was first investigated in 1890 by the
United States Geologic Survey. The project was judged infeasible.10
In 1927 such a proposal was favorably reported on by E. F. Chandler, Dean of the University of North Dakota College of Engineering.11
The North Dakota Legislative Assembly supported the project by
informing the United States Senate that North Dakota would make
lands available for a dam and reservoir on the Missouri River
12
to be located 80 miles northwest of Bismarck.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers considered the
project in 1937, but was not favorably impressed by its economic
feasibility. The Corps indicated costs would be $54 million and
benefits only $10 million. The North Dakota Waters Conservation
Commission revamped the project and came up with a 20% reduction in costs and a one-to-four cost-benefit ratio.13 The Corps modified
its plan in light of the state proposal, but no congressional approval
14
was forthcoming.
Congressional approval for the first step of Garrison Diversion,
the creation of a reservoir, was finally granted in 1944.15 The
legislation was a "reconciliation"'16 or "shotgun wedding" 17 of separate plans developed by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation." Under the 1944 act, the Corps was granted authority
over dam construction and flood control and the Bureau gained
control of irrigation and hydro-electric power.1 9 It has been suggested that fear of the creation of a Missouri Valley Association,
similar in nature to the Tennessee Valley Authority, which would
have replaced many of their functions in the area, prompted the
agreement between the feuding agencies. 20 Construction on Garrison
9.
U.S. 1IUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INITIAL
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TII-7 (1973).

10.
11.
12.
to the
13.

STAGE

GARRISON

DIVERSION

UNIT

DRAFT

EN-

1 BIENNIAL REP. OF N.D. ST. ENO. 47 (1904).
Chandler, Missouri River Diversion in North Dakota, 18 Q.J.U.N.D. 16 (Nov., 1927).
Con. Res. 5, 20th Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess., S. & H. JOUR. 245-47 (1928) responding
introduction of S. Res. 15, 69 CONG. REC. 352 (1927).
1 BIENNIAL REP. OF N.D. WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION 9-11

(1938).

14. 2 BIENNIAL REP. OF N.D. WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION 69-77 (1940).
15. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-887, ch. 665, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 887, 891.
16. Hearings on H.R. 4795 Before the House Comm. on Irrigation and Reclamation, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1944).
17. H. HART, THE DARK MISSOURI 129 (1957).
18. H.R. Doc. No. 475, S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944), rmconciled in S. Doc.
No. 247, 78th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1944).
19. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-887, ch. 665, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 887, 891.
20. H. HART, supra note 17, at 129 ; G. SHERWOOD, supra note 8, at 15; see H.R. Doc. No.
680 & 784, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). In reference to this point Senator Gillette stated:
It was at about this time that both the distinguished Senator from Montana
(Mr. MURRAY] and I introduced bills to create a Missouri Valley Authority.
The effect of these two bickering, battllng agencies was alzmost electric. Within
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Dam began in 1947 and was completed in 1955.21
In anticipation of Garrison Diversion the North Dakota Legis-

lative Assembly authorized the formation of Garrison Conservancy
District to facilitate development and local administration of the
project. 22 Two years later the Bureau of Reclamation submitted
a proposal to irrigate 1,000,000 acres of North Dakota farm land
with water from Garrison Reservoir.2 8 Despite considerable support
24
in North Dakota, the measure failed to get out of committee.
In 1959 a modified project was proposed which reduced irrigated
acreage by 75%.25 The Bureau of Budget declared the revised

project to be "at best" of "marginal"
27

economic justification.2 6

This measure also failed to win passage.
The 250,000 acre project was further refined and resubmitted
in 1962.28 After extensive consideration, 29 Congress finally authorized the basic project.3 0
The initial stage project, as currently authorized and proceeding, involves the construction of a canal system to transfer water
from "the Missouri River to the James River, Souris River and
Sheyenne River basins, and Devils Lake basin.""1 The source of
the water is Lake Sakakawea, the reservoir behind Garrison Dam.3 2
The principal features of the main supply works will be Lake
Audubon, McClusky Canal, and Lonetree Reservoir. Water will be
pumped from Lake Sakakawea into adjoining Lake Audubon. The
water will then flow through McClusky Canal to Lonetree Reser60 days after our bills were introduced-on October 16 and 17, 1944-the Army
and the Bureau of Reclamation held a joint meeting In Omaha, Nebr., and in
those 2 days claimed that they had completely integrated their conflicting plans.
. . . The Bureau simply yielded the Army the right to build two or three mainstem dams that it had planned, and the Army got out of the Bureau's irrigation
field. Then they agreed to quit criticizing each other, lest Congress create an
MVA.
95 CONo. REc. 1710 (1949).
21. G. SnmwooO, supra note 8, at 15.
22. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 61-24 (1960); see also Beck & Newgren, Irrigation in North
Dakota Through Garrison Diversion: An Institutional Overview, 44 N.D. L. REV. 465
(1967-68) ; Roland & Cooper, An Agricultural View: Irrigation Organizations and a Case
Study through North Dakota Law, 38 N.D. L. REv. 302 (1962).
23. H.R. Doc. No. 325, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. XVI (1960).
24. 103 CONG. REC. 13, 1107-08 (Index 1957).
25. R.R. Doc. No. 325, supra note 23, at IX.
26. Id. at VI.
27. 107 CONG. RPc. 17, 1001 (Index 1961) ; 105 CONG. REC. 16, 1102, 1104 (Index 1959).
28. Hearings on S. 178 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
29. Hearings on S. 34 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; Hearings on H.R. 1003,
1013 & 9046 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) ; H.R. REP. No. 282, S. REP. No.
470, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; H.R. REP. No. 1606, S. REP. No. 870, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
30. Act of Aug. 5, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-108, 79 Stat. 433.
31. 'U.S. BuREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 9, at I-5. As the Environmental Impact
Statement notes at I-1 the basic Garrison Diversion Project as set out in H.R. Doc. No.
325, supra note 23, consists of 1,007,000 acres, however, only an Initial stage of the project
consisting of 250,000 acres has been authorized.
32. Id. at I-8.
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voir.3 3 The Canal will be 74 miles long and of "river-size proportions." 34 Its construction will require the acquisition of over 10,000
acres of rights of way.3 5 From Lonetree Reservoir the water is
to be directed north to the upper McHenry County area through
the Velva Canal and west to portions of Ramsey, Foster and Nelson
Counties through the New Rockford Canal. Some of the water from
the latter canal will be diverted into the James River for downstream irrigation. The Velva Canal will be 84 miles long and the
New Rockford Canal with major extensions will be 108 miles long.38
The project also involves 1,000 miles of distribution and drainage
systems in the form of open canals and closed conduits as well
as the channelization of an as yet undetermined number of water
courses in the project area.3 7 Construction work is currently proceeding on several portions of McClusky Canal. 3 It is estimated
that the entire 250,000 acres will be under irrigation by 1993. 31
II. INTERNATIONAL
WATERS TREATY

CONSIDERATIONS:

THE

BOUNDARY

Despite near universal enthusiasm in North Dakota for the
project during the blueprint phase, the construction has encountered
a certain amount of opposition. On the international scene, Canada
has voiced concern about salinization of downstream land areas and
40
pollution of the Souris and Red Rivers.
Apparently the Bureau of Reclamation previously did not view
the international implications of Garrison Diversion as a serious
problem. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement mentions a
potential difficulty only in connection with the Souris River:
When mixed with natural flows of the river, stream-flow at
the Canadian border may be expected to average about
227,200 acrefeet annually and would contain about 1,320
mg/i of TDS under equilibrium conditions. The change in the
quality of the water has caused some concern to Canada and
is under study (See Chapter IV-D). Release of project water
to dilute return flows before they are discharged into Canada
does not appear to be feasible. To avoid salt buildup in the
soils of the area, no reuse 41of return flow is anticipated under
initial stage development.
Chapter IV-D states only that a meeting was held on February
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1-6.
Id. at 1-5.
Id. at I-11.
Id. at 1-17 to 24.
Id. at 1-20, -26, -29, -32, table 4.
Id. at 1-3.
Id. at I-7.
Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
U.S. BUREAU o RECLAMATION, supra note 9, at 111-14.
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8, 1973 between Canada and the United States and there a task
force was proposed to study the problem. 42 However, it is now
a year later and no solution has been reached.
The importance of the return flow problem was quickly brought
to the Bureau's attention. A letter to the Honorable Gilbert C.
Stamm, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, from John
A. Green, Regional Administrator of Environmental Protection
Agency, stated:
In our view, the cursory nature of the discussion in the EIS
concerning return flow accruals to Canada represents a major underestimation of the severity of this problem. In lieu
of the brief outline of the situation as presented in the draft
EIS, we urge that full consideration be given to this complex
problem in a final statement, and that the responsibilities
and obligations of the U.S. Government and the Bureau of
Reclamation with regard to the provisions of
43 the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty be considered in full.
The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty 4 is certainly applicable to
the present salination problem; but how the Treaty affects salination
of the Souris and Red Rivers is highly debatable. The Treaty,
itself, declares that it exists:
to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters
and to settle all questions which are now pending between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the
rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the
other or to the inhabitants of the other, along this common
frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise. .... 45
To implement the purposes of the Treaty the contracting parties
established the International Joint Commission. 4 The Commission
has differing functions which are dependent upon the nature of
the problem presented and the classification of water involved. 47
42. Id. at IV-32.
43. EPA, COMMENTS ON GARRISON DIVERSION DRAFTr EIS, Aug. 1, 1973, at 17. An accompanying letter contains comments regarding to Draft Environmental Impact Statement
and describes it as inadequate. Letter from John A. Green to Gilbert C. Stamm, August 1,
1973.
44. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548, hereinafter referred to as the
Treaty. For an historical discussion of events leading to the signing of the Treaty see L.
BLOOMFIELD & G.

FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

1-13 (1958).
45. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
46. Id. art. VII at 2451. For a detailed discussion of the function and operation of the
International Joint Commission see Waite, The International Joint Commision-Its Practice and Its Impact on Land Use, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1963).
47. The Treaty refers to boundary waters, Id. art. III at 2449-50; waters flowing from
boundary waters, rivers flowing across the boundary, and waters in rivers flowing across
the boundary. Id. art. IV at 2450.
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Generally, these include a quasi-judicial function,4' 8 an investigative function,49 an administrative function"0 and an arbitral 'function.51

The quasi-judicial authority of the International Joint Commission is dependent upon power granted in Article VIII. Article VIII
provides that:
The International Joint Commission shall have jurisdiction
over and pass upon all cases involving the use or obstruction
or diversion of the waters with respect to which under Articles III and IV of this treaty the approval of this Commission is required .... 52
Therefore, if under the Treaty, the International Joint Commission

is to have compulsory jurisdiction over any project affecting the
Souris or Red Rivers, authorization must be found in either Article
III or IV. Article III refers only to boundary waters53 and is not
applicable.
However, Article IV provides:
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except in cases
provided for by special agreement between them, they will
not permit the construction or maintenance on their respective sides of the boundary of any remedial or protect48. This judicial type function actually consists of approving any project that involves
the use, obstruction, or diversion of waters over which the commission has control under
Articles III and IV. Also included are projects located on boundary waters or< trans-boundary
rivers which raise the elevation of the natural level of the water on either side of the
boarder. Id. art. VIII at 2451-52.
49. The High Contracting Parties further agree that any other questions or matters
of difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations, or interests
of either in relation to the other. . . . along the common frontier between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada, shall be referred from time to time
to the International Joint Commission for examination and report, whenever either
the Government of the United States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that such questions or matters of difference be so referred.
The International Joint Commission is authorized in each case so referred to
examine Into and report upon the . . . questions and matter's referred, together
with such conclusions and recommendations as may be appropriate, subject, however, to any restrictions or exceptions which may be imposed with respect
thereto by the terms of the reference.
Such reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as decisions of the questions
or matters so submitted either on the facts or the law, and shall in no way have
the character of an arbitral award.
Id. art. IX at 2452.
50. Id. art. XII at 2453-54.
51. Id. art. X at 2453. Article X has never been used.
52. Id. art. VIII at 2451.
53. Boundary waters are defined:
as the water's from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers -and connecting waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the International boundary
between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including . . .
tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow Into such lakes,
rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways,
or the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.
Id. Preliminary art., at 2443-49. Therefore, neither the Souris nor the Red River qualifies as
a boundary water. Instead both are classified as rivers flowing across the boundary. L.
BLOMsFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 44, at 251.
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tive works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than
the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect
of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other
side of the boundary unless the construction or maintenance
thereof 5is4 approved by the aforesaid InternationalJoint Commission.

Therefore, in order for the International Joint Commission to obtain
jurisdiction under Article IV, the river in question must flow across
the boundary, the natural level of waters on the other side of
the boundary must be raised, and certain construction must take
place at the lower reaches of the river.
A strong argument can be made that the Souris River is subject
to the jurisdiction of the International Joint Commission. First,
the Souris satisfies the requirement of being a river which flows
across the boundary. Next, no one disputes that the natural level
of the waters across the boundary will be increased by the return
flows. 5 Finally, some type of drain into the river will have to
be constructed to enable the return flows to enter the water.5 ,
This drain or drains will be installed at a lower level of the
river.5 7 The only real problem relates to the type of construction
involved - does the construction of a drain meet the requirement
of Article IV?
The Treaty indicates that any remedial 8 work on a lower
level of a river whose waters cross the boundary would be subject
to International Joint Commission jurisdiction. The Bureau of Reclamation in its Draft Environmental Impact Statement has argued:
Although water quality of the Souris River will be degraded
to some extent by project return flows, some positive environmental impacts will result from their accrual to the
river. Streamflow will be stabilized with augmentation of low
flows, high salt concentrations during low flow periods will
be diluted, and no-flow conditions will be eliminated in most
cases. Increased water supplies will become available to the
storage and waterfowl facilities of the J. Clark Saylor National Wildlife Refuge near Upham.59
54. Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548, art. 1v (emphasis added).
55. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Initial Stage Garrison Diversion Unit Draft Environmental Impact Statement II-13 to -14 (1972) ; Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 17, 1973, at 1,
col. 2.
56. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 9, at 1-15 to -20.
57. Id. frontispiece.
58. Remedial Is defined as "affording a remedy; intended for a remedy or for the removal or abatement of an evil.
" Remedy is defined as "that which corrects or counteracts an evil of any kind .
Synonyms of remedy are "aid" and "help". WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THR ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2016 (2d ed. 1934).

59.

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, aUpra note 9. at 111-14.
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The Bureau of Reclamation is stressing the remedial effects of
the discharge of return flows into the Souris River. Thus all requirements of Article IV of the Treaty have been met and the International Joint Commission has established jurisdiction.
There is also a possibility that previous dockets have established
a basis for jurisdiction. The International Joint Commission has,
in the past, considered applications for reclamation works affecting
rivers which are subject to Commission jurisdiction under Article
IV 60° Perhaps by analogy this jurisdiction can be extended to embrace irrigation projects which also have an affect on Article IV
waters.
Once jurisdiction has been established, the Bureau of Reclamation and the United States Government need approval by the International Joint Commission for that part of the Garrison Diversion
Project that affects the Souris River. Over one-third of the total
Project depends upon the release of returr flows into the Souris
River." If Commission approval were not forthcoming, the results
to the Project would be disastrous. Even if approved, however,
the Commission is required to make certain that all interests adversely affected across the border are compensated.6 2 Such payments could be substantial.
If compulsory jurisdiction by the International Joint Commission is not established under Article VIII, the Treaty remains relevant to the return flow issue. Article IV of the Treaty contains
a prohibition against pollution of both boundary waters and waters
flowing across the boundary.6 3 Discharge of return flows containing
on the average 1,740 mg/1 of total dissolved solids (TDS) will
increase the salinity of the Souris River to 1,320 mg/1 of TDS
under equilibrium conditions.6 4 There is no doubt that this increase
6 5
in salinity constitutes pollution.
60.
61.
62.

L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 44, at 251.
U.S. BURFEAU OF RECLAMATION, st'p:'C note 9, at frontispiece.
In cases involving the elevation of the natural level of waters on either side
of the line as a result of the construction or maintenance on the other side of
remedial or protective works or dams . . . or in waters flowing therefrom or in
waters below the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the commission shall require, as a condition of its approval thereof, that suitable and adequate provision, approved by it, be made for the protection and indemnity of all
interests on the other side of the line which may be Injured thereby.
Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548, art. VIII.
63. It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and
waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the
injury of health or property on the other.
Id. art. IV at 2450. For a history of this pollution provision see Ross, National Sovereignty
in InternationalEnvironmental Decisions, 12 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 242 (1972).
64. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 9. at 111-14.

65. The Helsinki Rules in Article IX define water pollution as "any detrimental change
resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the waters
of the international drainage basin." Gantz, United States Approaches to the Salinity Problem on the Colorado River, 12 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 496, 506 n. 30 (1972).
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Unfortunately, the mandatory provisions of Article VIII have
no application to the provision in Article IV banning pollution.
The International Joint Commission can become involved in pollution controversies only when they are referred under Article IX 6 G
or X. 67 In 1928, a reference under Article IX involving air pollution
was made to the Commission. 6 It involved pollution in Washington
resulting from a smelter operated in British Columbia. A convention 6 9 resulted from this reference which established an arbitral
tribunal to make a final settlement of the air pollution problem.
In its final decision, the tribunal cited cases from the United States
Supreme Court dealing with both air and water pollution as authority and ordered the smelter to refrain from causing further damage
through air pollutants to the State of Washington. The tribunal extablished controls to regulate the smelter's activity 70 and stated:
The tribunal finds that under the principles of international
law, as well as the law of the United States, no state has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such
a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence.
The Tribunal therefore holds that the Dominion of Canada
is responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail
Smelter and that it is the duty of the Government of the
Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct is in conformity with the obligation of the
71 Dominion under international law as herein determined.
As indicated in the decision, the Tribunal referred to cases
involving water pollution when seeking tenets of international law
applicable to the dispute. Therefore, precedent applicable to the
pollution of the Souris River has already been established by the
Commission and there is no doubt that the Commission would
have the authority to either prohibit the salination of the Souris
River or establish conditions under which the return flow could
be discharged into the river.
Even if mandatory International Joint Commission jurisdiction
cannot be established, and the United States does not honor its
66. Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548 ; see also text, supra note 49.
67. Treaty With Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548 ; see also text, supra note 51.
68. Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail,
British Columbia, April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935), T.S. No. 20.
69. Trail Smelter Investigation No. 25 cited in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BouNDARY
WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA

AND THE UNITED STATES 183

(1958).

70.

Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 85 AM. J. INT. L. 648 (1941).

71.

Id. at 684.
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obligation under the terms of the Treaty not to pollute rivers
flowing across the boundary, some sort of agreement will have
to be reached with Canada. Canadian officials have repeatedly
stated that they "want no degradation of water.' 72 In a similar
situation involving the salination of the Colorado River, the United
States has only recently come to an agreement with Mexico. For
the past 12 years Mexican authorities have been complaining that
the salination of the Colorado River in the United States has ruined
irrigable cropland in Mexico. Over 185 million dollars in damages
have been claimed as a direct result of American irrigation projects. In the IBWC MINUTE NO. 242'7 the United States has agreed
to spend over 115 million dollars to alleviate the problem.74 It
is hoped that the 115 million dollars will informally settle all private
damage claims.75 In any event, salination of the Colorado River
has cost the United States a great deal of money.
From previous discussion it seems that the United States has
two alternatives. It can allow the International Joint Commission
to make a determination of the Souris River controversy or it
can negotiate independently with Canadian officials. Foreign policy
dictates that some sort of arrangement be made. In either case
the final result will be either the abandonment of the one-third
of the Garrison Diversion Project which will cause the salination
of the Souris or an agreement whereby the United States will
guarantee a certain quality of water to Canada and will agree
to a settlement of all just claims resulting from increased salinity
of the river. If one-third of the project is abandoned, the economic
benefits of the remainder of the project are questionable. If a
monetary settlement is reached, experience with Mexico shows that
the expenditure will be enormous. As a result, the seriousness
of the Souris River salination problem becomes material to any
substantive review of the Garrison Diversion Project under the
National Environmental Policy Act.
III.

NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

THE NATIONAL ENVIRON-

MENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
Close to home, the Committee to Save North Dakota filed suit
72. Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
73. Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the
Colorado River, 69 DrP'T STATE BULL. 395 (1973).
74. United States and Mexico Reach Agreement on Colorado River Salinity Problem, 69
DEP'T STATE BULL. 388 (1973). The methods to be used include construction of a desalination plant, use of water stored behind dams on the Colorado River for dilution and purchase of agricultural lands to take them out of production.
75. For a discussion of access to American courts by Canadian citizens to settle private
damage claims caused by pollution see McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries:
Jurisdictional Consideration in Private Litigation Between Canada and the United States,
3 CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 191 (1973).
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against Rogers Morton as Secretary of the Department of the Interior in the federal district court of North Dakota on December
11, 1972.76 The plaintiffs alleged causes of action under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 196977 (NEPA) and other environmen76. Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, No. 73-1198 (D.N.D., filed Dec. 11, 1972).
77. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. Text of
Title I is as follows:
SEC. 101. (a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's
activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization,
industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological
advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, included financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coo dinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3)
attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the enivironment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our
national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
SEC. 102. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
Act, and (2) all agenices of the Federal Goverinment shall(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and in decision making which may have an impact
on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with
the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with
economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible officiaX on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal ' be implemented,
(iII) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
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tal statutes.78 The court denied the plaintiff's motion for a prelim-

inary injunction and ordered the suit scheduled at the earliest
possible date for determination on the merits.79 The defendant
indicated that a final environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the requirements of NEPA would be available to the
public on November 15, 1973, and that no new major construction
would be initiated prior to that date. 0 The denial of the motion
for a preliminary injunction was upheld by the Eight Circuit Court
of Appeals.8 '
Litigation on the NEPA cause of action will probably focus
on two main points: 1) the adequacy of the final EIS; and 2)
the depth of the court's review of the agency decision to proceed.
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made
available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the
public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D)
study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;
(E)
recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment;
(F)
make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and
individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and
development of resource-oriented projects; and
(H)
assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by title
IT of this Act.
SEC. 103. All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present
statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures
for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of
this Act and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such
measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this Act.
SEC. 104. Nothing in Section 102 or 103 shall in any way affect the specific
statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1)
to comply with criteria or
standards of environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other
Federal or State agency, or (3)
to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon
the recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State agency.
SEC. 105. The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to
those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies. Id. at 852-54.
78. Brief for Appellee at 6, Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, No. 73-1198 (D.N.D.,
filed Dec. 11, 1972) ; see also Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-224, 84 Stat. 114; Fish and Wildlife Coordinating Act, Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401
(1934), Pub. L. No. 79-732, 60 Stat. 1080 (1946), Pub. L. No. 85-623, 72 Stat. 563 (1958)
Water Bank Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-559, 84 Stat. 1468.
79.

Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, No. 73-1198 (D.N.D., order of Feb. 12. 1973).
80. Brief for the Appelees, Appendices B and C, Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton,
476 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1973). Current indications are that the final EIS will be available
to the public by March, 1974. See Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 11, 1974, at 8, col. 4.
81. Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, 476 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1973).

NOTE
A.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA requires the filing of an EIS by
the lead or project agency. That requirement has been described
as part of that great volume of law which "make the land fit
for lawyers to live in, with no great impact on the environment
itself. '82 This section was not included in the legislation originally
proposed for consideration by the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs. The legislation was redrafted to include the
requirement after testimony at the committee hearings which suggested the inclusion of "action forcing or operational measures." 8
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was formed by
Title II of NEPA.8 4 Its main function consists of advising the
President on envinronmental concerns. Pursuant to Executive Order
11514,15 the CEQ has issued guidelines for the preparation of an
EIS 88 In response to the requirements of these guidelines, the
major federal agencies have issued their own internal guidelines
8
for compliance with this requirement of NEPA. 7
The exact requirements of an adequte EIS are not clear.
The question has been voluminously covered elsewhere 8 and
will not be considered in this note. One factor relevant to Garrison
Diversion is the weight to be given comments of other agencies required to be solicited under CEQ guidelines.
NEPA requires that each EIS be made available to the CEQ,
but the duties and functions of the CEQ do not include review
and evaluation. 9 The CEQ budget and staff are too limited to
do anything but give a general overview and point out the most
glaring difficulties. ° The power of the CEQ lies mainly in negotiation with agencies and its ability to persuade the President to
halt ill-conceived projects. 91 While it has been suggested that sub82. Interview with Peter Walker, Minister of 'the Dep't. of Environment, U.K., in S.
Lindsay, 55 SAT. Rav. 64, 70 (Jan. 1, 1972).
83. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, on S. 1075, 237 &
1752, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969). In response to this testimony Senator Jackson stated:
I agree with you that realistically what Is needed in restructuring the governmental side of this problem Is to legislatively create those situations that will
bring about an action-forcing procedure the departments must comply with.
Otherwise, these loftly declarations are nothing more than that. It Is merely a
finding and statement but there Is no requirement as to implementation.
Id.
84. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 854.
85. 3 C.F.R. 902 (1971).
86. 36 Fed. Reg.7724 (1971) ; 38 Fed. Reg.20550 (1973).
87. 37 Fed. Reg. 22668 (1972).
88. E.g., Kross, Prepartion of an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv.
81 (1972-73) ; Comment, Impact Statement under the NEPA, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 553.
89. Gelse, NEPA Federal Guidelines, INsTiTuTE ON NATuR&L REsoURcas AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-1, 3-18, -19 (1972).
90. Hansen, NEPA: Problems and Outer Limits, Institute on National Resources and Environmental Law 7-1, -12 (1972).
91. Gelse, supra note 89, at 3-18.
92. 3 C.F.R. 902 (1971).
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section 3 (i) of Executive Order 115142 authorizes continued remand
by the CEQ until an adequate EIS is filed, it has never been exercised.9 3 The CEQ has requested the suspension of a government
project on three occasions. On two of these occasions, the Cross
Florida Barge Canal and the Everglades Airport extension, the
projects were halted. The third occasion was in relation to Garrison
Diversion, and the project was not suspended. In his request Russell
Train, Chairman of the CEQ, voiced concern about loss of wetlands,
irrigation methods, increased river salinity, and lowered water
94
tables.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has rated the
most recent draft EIS on Garrison Diversion as inadequate and
offered 43 pages of specific objections and concerns ranging from
carp introduction and their effect on duck breeding to increased
river salinity.95 The Bureau of Reclamation is thus confronted with
the issue of the extent to which it may ignore the comments
of agencies with environmental expertise. In the landmark case, Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm. v. A.C. Comm'n,9 6 the Atomic Energy
Commission was chastized for attempting to defer its own judgment
on water quality to the certification process of another agency.
The court emphasized that "individualized balancing analysis" was
required. However the court differentiated between NEPA balancing judgments and certifying judgments. 97 The latter merely required a determination of whether pollution exceeds pre-set limits.
The case did not speak directly to the role of agency comments,
but gave support by implication to the absolute independence of
lead agency judgments.9 8
Few courts have directly considered the weight to be accorded
the comments of other agencies. One district court stated explicitly
that "[w]hile impact statements are to be filed with CEQ for
comment, such comment is advisory only."'9 9 The Tenth Circuit
has described the CEQ's functions as "in no way regulatory.' '100
This is an affirmance of the generally acknowledged limitations
of the CEQ's role. This, however, does not speak to EPA comments.
93. 1 A. REITZE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW one-112. (1972).
94. Letter from Russell Train to Rogers Morton, June 15, 1973.
95. EPA, COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT FOR THE INITIAL STAGE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT (Aug. 1, 1973).

96.
(D.C.
97.
98.

Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States A.E. Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109
Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1123.
For example:
Thus the Congress was surely cognizant of federal, state and local agencies
"authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards." But it provided,
in Section 102(2) (C), only for full consultation. It most certainly did not authorize a total abdication to those agencies. Nor did it grant a license to disregard the main body of NEPA obligations.

Id.
99. Brooks v. Volpe, 850 F. Supp. 269, 275 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
100. National Helium v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971).

NOTE

The EPA was established as an environmental overseer by
Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970.101 It has assumed duties in relation
to the environment originally vested in other executive departments.
The CEQ guidelines on EIS preparation'0 2 and § 309 of the Clean
Air Act 10 3 both provide that the EPA shall comment on projects
subject to NEPA requirements and if the action is determined
to be unsatisfactory the matter shall be referred to the CEQ.
While this provision for EPA comment does not directly support
the thesis that such comments have a binding effect on lead agencies, in the most exhaustive judicial discussion of NEPA requirements to date 0 4 it was suggested that lead agencies were in most
cases required to defer to other agencies' commentary in the latter's
area of expertise. Pointing out that Congress did not intend that
mandated consultation with an agency in its area of expertise
be ignored by the lead agency, it was suggested that the process
was a form of environmental check and balance within the executive branch. 103
B.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Before discussing the issue of substantive review by
of an agency decision to proceed with a particular
is necessary to differentiate between substantive rights
and substantive duties of agencies under NEPA.
Section 101 (b) of NEPA as originally approved by
read as follows:

the courts
project, it
of citizens
the Senate

The Congress recognizes that each person has a fundamental
and inalienable right to a healthful environment and that
each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment. 0 6
In conference this language was deleted and was replaced by §
101 (c), which reads:
The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of
07
the environment.
This milder language "was adopted because of doubt on the
part of House conferees with respect to the legal scope of the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

3 C.F.r-L 1072 (1971).
36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971) ; 38 Fed. Reg.20550 (1973).
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1709.
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
Id. at 1348-49.
S. RP.No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 853.
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original Senate provision."' 0 8 In commenting on this change Senator
Henry M. Jackson, the bill's primary sponsor, stated:
I opposed this change in conference committee because
it is my belief that the language of the Senate-passed bill
reaffirmed what is already the law of this land; namely,
that every person does have a fundamental and an inalienable right to a healthful environment. If this is not the law
of this land, if an individual in this great country of ours
cannot at the present time protect his right and the right
of his family to a healthful environment, then it is my view
that some fundamental changes are in order. 10 9
That statement leads directly to the issue of whether the United
States Constitution creates a right to environmental quality. The
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been suggested
as the source of such a right by several commentators; 10 the
courts, however, have yet to find a constitutional right of this
nature."' In a rather cynical analysis of constitutional rights not
specifically enumerated, one commentator has suggested that "we
stand marking time, anticipating a moment when the environment
deteriorates to such a point that the Court is compelled to confirm
that, along with free speech and religion, there exists a right
to an environment fit for human habitation. 11 2 Perhaps the blame
for the failure of courts to recognize such a right lies partially
with attorneys for their failure to press such claims with sufficient
vigor." 8
Senator Jackson further stated:
To dispel any doubts about the existence of this right, I
intend to introduce an amendment to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 as soon as it is signed by the President. This amendment will propose a detailed congressional
declaration of a statutory bill of environmental right." 4
Several such bills have been introduced, but none have been enacted
1 5
into law.
108. CONG. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) ; 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMrN.
Nnws 2767, 2768-69 (1969).
109. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969).
110. E.g., Nate, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458
(1970); Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061
(1971); Roberts, Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environmental Equals Man
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. Rlv. 674 (1969-70).
111. E.g., EDF v. TVA, No. 1190 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 1972) ; Tanner v. Armco Steel, 340
F. Supp. 532, 534-35 (S.D. Tex. 1972) ; Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs.,
825 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971) aff'd 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert4 denied, 409
U.S. 1072 (1973).
112. Roberts, supra note 110, at 691.
113. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1199 (4th Cir. 1971).
114.

115 CoNa. REC. 40416

(1969).

115. Muskie & Cutler, A National Environmental Policy: Now You See It, Now You Don't,
25 Me. L. REv. 163, 178-85 (1973).
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In relation to § 101 (c), individual rights, and the above sequence
of events, one commentator has stated that "[t]he legislative
history . . .is ambiguous; one can only say that such a possibility
was thought of and not categorically rejected." 116 In support of
the existence of individual rights pursuant to section 101 (c), it
has been claimed that the change in language altered but did
not eliminate a special congressional interest in health. This special
interest may recognize a substantive legal right leading to private
legal action and the preclusion of balancing of interests in threat
to life situations. 11

This analysis is supported by the section-by-

section analysis submitted to the Senate by Senator Jackson:
This subsection asserts congressional recognition that
each person should enjoy a healthful environment. It is apparent that the guarantee of the continued enjoyment of any
individual right is dependent upon individual health and safety. It is further apparent that deprivation of an individual's
healthful 1environment
will result in the deprivation of all of
18
his rights.
A more restrained, and perhaps a more correct, analysis is that
the language was altered because of a fear that the original language would lead to injunctions against actions of the federal government that in any manner decreased the healthfulness of the
environment."19 Thus § 101 (c) "does not appear to create any express
' 12 0
individual right to a healthful environment.
The federal courts hay universally accepted this analysis.'2
Their position is best stated in Upper Pecos Assoc. v. Stans:
[Tihese words are almost precatory in nature. Had the
116. Coleman, Possible Repercussions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 on
the Private Law Governing Pollution Abatement, 3 NATURAL RESOURCEs LAW 647. 655; (1970).
117. Hanks & Hanks, Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 250-51 (1969-70). In expounding
this contention the authors stated:
Life is the primary value. Without it,all other rights are meaningless. It would
seem appropriate and entirely In keeping with the spirit of the Act, therefore.
to read subsection 101(c) exactly as had been intended in the Senate version.
That is to say, aside from the interests created by the remainder of title I, and
enforceable in public actions, subsection 101(c) recognizes a "legal right" in every
individual to a healthful environment. What does such a Tight mean? First, anyone suing to enforce it, is entitled to his remedy if his right is found to have
been abridged. His suit, in other words, is a private, not a public action. Second,
a legal right to a healthful environment could, in certain circumstances, preclude
any balancing or weighing of interests during the governmental decision snaking
process; that is,in some situations no amount of dollars will outweigh the threat
to life.
(emphasis in original)
Id.
118. 115 CoNG. REc. 40419 (1969).
119. Yannacone, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL L. 8, 13-14
(1970-71).
120. Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 685, 687 (1971-72)
(emphasis in original)
121. E.g., Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
'
406 U.S. 944, vacated, 409 U.S. 1621 (1972).

346

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Congress intended to create a positive and enforceable legal
right or duty, it would have said so, and would not have
limited itself to words of entreaty. In the absence of any
clear statement,
this Court must assume that no such inten122
tion existed.

Using a broader approach, some plaintiffs have claimed that
§ 101 of NEPA creates rights in individuals to "safe, healthful,
productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings. ' 12

24
The courts have not been impressed.1
The importance of distinguishing between substantive rights in

individuals and substantive duties of agencies under NEPA is that

most courts which deny have a duty to substantially review agency
decisions to proceed to do so on the basis of lack of substantive rights

in individuals. 25 "But that should not be the end of the matter,
for 'substance' inheres in more than the creation of an enforceable
right.' 126 It has been suggested that, "the courts' refusal to enforce
the substantive provisions of NEPA frustrates the legislative intent
of the statute and impedes the Act's declared purpose of protecting

the environment.'

27

and "independent

reading"

This is supported by an inventive analysis
of NEPA's language and legislative

history. The interpretation is based on a structural analysis of
12

the Act's phraseology.
The Calvert Cliffs" 29 decision took a more direct approach to
interpretation of NEPA's language. In that case the court deter-

mined that "to the fullest extent possible" applied to procedural
duties which would be rigorously enforced by the courts. As to

substantive duties "all practicable means"''

0

was declared to be

122. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 940 F. Supp. 532, 538-39 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
123. EDF v. TVA, No. 1130 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 1972) ; Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans. 452
F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 944, vacated, 409 U.S. 1621 (1972) ;
EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs. 325 F. Supp. 728. 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1973).
124, Id.
125. E.g., Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 225 (M.D.N.C.),
aff'd, No. 72-1276 (4th Cir. May 2, 1971), summary fudgment remanded, 473 F.2d 664 (4th
Cir. 1973); EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916, 925 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Pizitz v.
Volpe, No. 3595-N (M.D. Ala. May 1,1972), aff'd, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972).
126. Coggins. Preparing an Environmental Lawsuit, Part I: Defining a Claim for Relief
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 58 IOWA L. REv. 277, 314 (1972-73).
127. Cohen, supra note 120, at 689.
128. "To the fullest extent possible" modifies not only the "action forcing" procedures of
§ 102(2), but also § 102(1), which provides that "the policies, regulations and public laws
of the United States shall be Interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth In the act.
These policies are set out in § 101. Legis'atlve support for the
importance of § 102(1) is found in the Conference Report which states that "the phrase
'to the fullest extent possible' applies with respect to those actions which Congress authorizes and directs to be done under both clauses (1) and (2) of section 102 ..
" (CoNe.
REP. No. 91-765, supra note 108, at 9.) The analysis under discussion further suggests that
§ 101 policy is limited only by "other essential considerations of national policy." "Thus section 101 imposes a substantive duty upon all instrumentalities of the government to decide
in favor of preserving or enhancing environmental quality in a given case, unless there is
a contravening consideration of essential national policy which justifies an environmentally
adverse decision." (Cohen. supra note 120, at 694.)
129. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
130. See note 36 for full text of act.
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an operative phrase indicating more flexible requirements.18 1 The
decision does not indicate that the previous analysis was investigated.

182

In light of the possibility that § 101 may create court enforceable substantive duties in agencies, one commentator has stated
that "[w]e can all join in hoping that the independent regulatory
agencies will heed the advice of the Congress while praying even
more fervently that no court will try to give those provisions any
binding effect."' 183
At least some courts are not susceptible to "fervent prayers."
In approving judicial review of agency decisions to proceed, the
Eighth Circuit emphasized that procedural duties under NEPA were
"action forcing" in relation to substantive duties, rather than ends
in themselves.

- 4
3

The court declared that the decision to review

could be supported either by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) '13 5 or the common law. They supported their conclusion re-

garding the APA by drawing on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe.186 In that case, the Supreme Court held that agency
action is subject to review on the merits, unless review is statutorily prohibited, or the action is committed to agency discretion
by law. This exception was narrowly limited to those situations
where statutes137 are drafted in such broad terms that there is no
law to apply.
1. Rationales for Substantive Review
Before discussing the standard of review, it is important to
examine the philosophical and practical rationales behind advocacy
of a searching review under NEPA standards of agency decisions
to proceed and the countervailing considerations. The most frequently cited reason for prefering broader review power in the courts
with respect to environmental matters is a basic distrust of agencies.
"[T]he New Deal optimism at having found, in the administrative
agency, the panacea for our ills has been replaced by almost
total disillusionment, distrust and cynicism on the part of the citi131.
1109,
132.
1109
133.

Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States A.E. Comm'n., 449 F.2d
1112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States A.E. Comm'n., 449 F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
Voight, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory

Agency: Some Unresolved Conflicts, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 13, 15 (1972).

Others have

advocated the concept of substantive duties with rear equal but opposite vigor. See Note,
Substance and Procedure in

the Construction of the National Environmental Policy Act, 6

J. L. REFORm 491, 506-10 (1972-73) ; Comment, Judicial Reviewe of Factul Issues Under the
National EnvironmentalPolicy Act, 51 ORE. L. Rnv. 408, 413-17 (1971-72).
134. EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
-1072 (1973).
135. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
136. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
137. Id. at 410.
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zens of this country...
,"138 Much of this distrust is based on
the capture theory. This has been described as the concept "that
administrative agencies are either captives of those whom they
regulate or wedded to the promotional missions that lead to their
creation .

. . . "18

The vulnerability of agencies to outside pressure,

especially when compared to the courts' relative immunity, is another factor in the distrust syndrome. 140 Despite legislation such
as NEPA, conservationists also consider the judiciary more dependable than politicians because of the latter's predelictions toward
compromise.14 1 It has also been charged that agencies have a ten1 42
dency to insulate themselves from all but special interest groups.
Another factor is the growing desire on the part of the general
public to shed the feeling of alienation and exclusion from govern-

ment: 148
[the] elements of the judicial process strongly support
the need . . . for citizens to feel that they are not merely
passive bystanders in making their government work. The
opportunity for anyone to obtain at least a hearing and
honest consideration of matters that he feels important must
not be underestimated. The availability of a judicial forum
means that access to government is a reality for the ordi-

nary citizen .

.

.14

A related concept is that there is no other feasible method of
correcting certain incorrect agency decisions.1 45
One of the primary considerations raised in opposition to broader
judicial review is lack of expertise in the courts to handle complex
environmental issues. 146 Frequently cited in support of this objection
is Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.147 However, careful examination of the case reveals that the decision not to exercise original
jurisdiction hinged more on the changing role of the Supreme Court
as an appellate body as opposed to a trial court, than on the
14 8
Court's lack of expertise in the environmental area.
138. Hearings on S. 1032 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, pt. 2, at 275 (1971).
139. Cramton & Berg, Enforcing the National Environmental Policy Act in Federal Agencie8, 18 PRAc. LAW. 79, 97 (May, 1972).
140. 3. SAX, DEFENDrNG THE ENVIRONMENT 108 (1970). In a similar vein Justice Douglas, In
a dissenting opinion, stated, "But they [federal agencies] are notoriously under the control
of powerful interests who manipulate them . . ., or who have that natural affinity with the
agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated." He went on to
document and trace the history of the phenomenon. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
745-48 (1972).
141. Rosenbaum & Roberts, The Year of Spoiled Pork: Comments on the Court's Entergence as an Environmental Defender, 7 L. & Soc'y REv. 33, 49 (1972-73).
142. Hanks, supra note 117, at 246.
143. Id.
144. J. SAX, supra note 140, at 112.
145. Coggins, supra note 126, at 317; see Hanks, supra note 117.
146. Comment, America's Changing Environment-Is the NEPA a Change for the Better?
L. REv. 897, 918 (1971-72),
40 FoRDHAM
147. 401 U.S. 493 (1971),
148. Id, at 497-99.
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The lack of expertise argument has been countered with references to other complex matters that the courts handle, such as
patent, antitrust, and rate regulation litigation. 1 9 Consideration must
also be given to the fact that in reviewing an agency decision
to proceed, courts do not substitute their knowledge for that of
experts but rather determine whether the agency decision to proceed
is supported by sufficient evidence. 50 The corollary supposition of
agency expertise has also been subject to attack.' 51 It has been
suggested that the decision makers in administrative agencies are
usually attorneys, rather than scientists or engineers, and thus,
152
not so different from judges in expertise or training.
A more philosophical argument raised to oppose the type of
judicial review under consideration relates to the proper role of
the judiciary. It is based either on the institutional infirmity of
the courts'9 8 or the impropriety of having courts make policy decisions. 5

4

In relation to the former, it has been pointed out that

the scope of environmental questions is so broad that a balancing
of social and economic values is required. This process is more
of an art than a science; an art which the courts are both particularly suited for and proficient at. 155 Courts have generally shown
themselves to be more sensitive to the changing values of society
than administrative agencies. 56
The policy contention is met most often by the argument that
the courts do not make public policy by review of administrative
decisions to proceed, but rather insure that public policy is made
rationally - in accordance with proper process and by the proper
entity. 57 A less frequently used, but better reasoned response is
an honest acknowledgment that courts do in fact have a public
policy making role. This requires a step beyond the Simple civics
analysis of our tri-partite government and a consideration of the
role of the courts in our common law system and the evolution
of our written Constitution.158 The courts have shown themselves
149. Hanks, supra note 117; Note, Environmental Law-NEPA of 1969, 18 LOYOLA L. REV.
717, 727 (1971-72).
150. T. SAX, supra note 140, at 150.
151. Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy,
71 MIcm. L. REv. 511, 531 (1972-73).
152. J. SAX, supra note 140, at 110.
153. Hearingson S. 1032, supra note 138, pt. 1 at 21.
154. J. SAX, supra note 140, at 149; Hearings on H.R. 49, 290, 4517, & 8050 Before the
Comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries,92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23, at 57 (1971).
155. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 629-30 (1970).
156. Comment, Preservation of the Environment Through the Doctrines Governing Judicial
Review of Administrative Agencies, 15 ST. Louis L.J. 429, 430 (1970-71). Similarly it has
been noted that the ability of a complex bureaucracy to explore alternative courses of
action is inherently limited. Cramton, supra note 151, at 531.
157. 3. SAX, supra note 140 at 151.
158. See Hearings on S. 1032, supra note 138, at 274; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1978) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to be more expert in determining the public interest than administrative agencies. 159

In relation to the alleged institutional infirmities of the court,
it has been pointed out that solution of environmental problems
18 0
requires affirmative programs and such is not the courts' domain.
This overlooks the basic role of judicial review under NEPA of

an agency decision to proceed. The inquiry goes to whether the
agency has met the duties imposed upon it by the act, rather
than to the formulation of broad designs to preserve environmental
quality.
The danger that judicial review will be used to impede environ-

mental action, the "two edged sword" theory, has been employed
by those opposed to substantive judicial review under NEPA. 161

This theory has also received support in case law.

62

This specter

has been at least partially exorcised by pointing out that industry

currently has full access to the courts in relation to rights infringed
by agency action and that broader judicial review under NEPA
would act as an equalizer.8 3

The problem of environmental control and restoration has been
described as, "to a large extent, the problem of the control of
administrative agencies by the courts.' 18 64 It has been claimed that
NEPA will not lead to significant self reform by agencies because
of basic institutional behavior patterns.'6 5 In contrast, it has been

suggested that those who look to the courts for salvation are "completely innocent of history"

-

history which indicates that the

"judiciary is inherently reactionary" and that agencies have been
effective agents of reform.' 6
2.

Judicial Application

Court application of the rationales for and against substantive
review under NEPA have varied. 67 The Tenth Circuit is currently
159. "Many agencies historically have been concerned more with economic cost-benefit
ratios, creation or protection of certain industries than with the spiritual, aesthetic, health
or other unquantifiable needs of man." Coggins, supra note 126, at 317.
160. Cramton, supra note 139, at 97-98.
161. Cramton, supra note 151, at 535.
162. E.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 467 F.2d
349 (3d Cir. 1972), remanded with directions, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
163. J. SAX, supra note 140, at 112-23. In reference to the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline litigation it has been stated that: "In a case such as this the National Environmental Policy Act
certainly can take on the sobriquet once reserved for the Colt revolver: 'the great equalizer'." A. REITZE, JR., supra note 93, at one-1l3.

164. Sive, supra note 155, at 615.
165. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239, 245 (1972-73).
166. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUF7ALO L. Rxv.
231, 231-32 (1970-71).
167. To limit confusion it is important to note that this is not a discussion of standarlds of
court review of agency decisions not to file an EIS. The various circuits have expressed
differing opinions on the appropriate standard of review under such circumstances. E.g.,
Wyoming Council v. Butz, No. 73-1477 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1973) ; Save Our Ten Acres v.
Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).

NoTE

the only federal appellate court to completely reject the concept
of substantive judicial review under NEPA of an agency decision
to proceed. The issue was first considered in National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, where the possibility was dismissed in one sentence. 168 Later, in Upper Pecos Ass'n. v. Stans, the court devoted
an entire paragraph to the issue.16 9 Careful readng of that decision
raises the possibility that the court is confusing the issues of substantive right in citizens and substantive duties required of agencies. 1' 0 In a more recent decision the court stated:
Reading the Act and its legislative history together, there
is little doubt that Congress intended all agencies under
their authority to7 follow the substantive and procedural mandates of NEPA.1 1
This case, however, was decided on the basis of failure to file
2
an EIS, thus making the court's statement nothing more than dicta.17
This dicta was relied on in a subsequent litigation of National
Helium Corp. v. Morton'" at the district court level. In that case,
the court cited the Department of Interior for failure to comply
with NEPA's substantive and procedural requirements. The conclusion of non-compliance with substantive requirements was based
on the decision that the EIS was so inadequate that the decisionmaker could not have given fair consideration to environmental
amenities. It was emphasized that "the court does not reach the
propriety of the Secretary's actual decision," and the possibility
of substantive review despite an adequate EIS was not discussed.1'7
Thus, while the Tenth Circuit remains the lone explicit hold
out, their attitude seems to be softening.' 7 5 Further indication is
a recent decision imposing strict and searching review on an agency
decision not to file an EIS. 1'7 6
Before considering the approaches of courts that recognize the
requirement of substantive judicial review under NEPA of agency
168. "The decisions are also clear that the mandates of the NEPA pertain to procedure
and do not undertake to control decision making within the departments." 455 F.2d 650, 656
(10th Cir. 1971).
169. The mandates of the N.E.P.A. pertain to procedure and not to substance, that
Is, decision-making In a given agency is required to meet certain procedural
standards, yet the agency is left in control of the substantive aspects of the decision. The N.E.P.A. creates no substantive rights in citizens to safe, healthful,
productive and culturally pleasing surroundings. Instead, the responsible agency
Is required to take these factors Into account at some point before commencement of the project.
452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971).
170. See text accompanying notes 121-26 supra.
171. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1972).
172. Id. at 598.
173. 361 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Kan. 1973).
174. Id. at 107.
175. See Davis v .Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1972); Upper Pecoes Ass'n v.
Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. grauted, 406 U.S. 944 (1972), vacated, 409
U.S. 1621 (1972) ; National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971).
176. Wyoming Council v. Butz, No. 73-1477 (10th Cir., Sept. 21, 1973).
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decisions to proceed, it is important to consider the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the APA in the Overton Park case.177 In that
case, plaintiffs challenged the Secretary of Transportation's authorization of federal funds for a highway extension through a park
in Memphis, Tennessee. The challenge was based on violation of
§ 138 of the Federal Aid Highways Act of 1968178 and § 4(f)

of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966.179 These acts
require that the Secretary of Transportation not approve highway
projects which will destroy parks unless "there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the use of such land." The Court stated
that "protection of parkland was to be given paramount import-

ance."' 80 It was further noted that if cost, community disruption,
and directness of route are set on an "equal footing" with parkland

preservation, then parks must generally yield to highways. "Thus
if Congress intended these factors to be on an equal footing with
preservation of parkland there would have been no need for the

statutes."' 8'
The Court's review of the Secretary's authorization of federal
funding was based on the APA.18 2 The substantial evidence test
of § 706 (2) (E) was rejected as applicable only when agency action

is pursuant to rulemaking power, or based on a public adjudicatory
hearing. Further, de novo review of § 706 (2) (F) was also rejected
as applicable only where agency action is adjudicatory in nature

and inadequate fact finding procedures are used, or in judicial
proceedings to enforce nonadjudicatory agency actions where new
issues are raised. 8
177. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
178. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
179. Federal Aid-Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815, 824.
180. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971).
181. Id. at 412.
182. To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, Interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall:
(1)
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2)
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be :
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdictions, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of its cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
183. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971).

NOTE
The standard of review approved by the Court consisted of
two parts. First, it was necessary to decide "whether the Secretary
acted within the scope of his authority." Second, the Court had
to determine whether the decision was, in the terms of § 706 (2) (A),
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." In making a decision, the court must
consider whether "all relevant factors" were taken into account
and whether the decision-maker made a "clear error in judgment."'"4
The Court emphasized that although "searching and careful inquiry" into the facts was authorized the court may not "substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.'

1

1

5

The Overton Park decision is important to substantive review
under NEPA in three respects. First, the decision points toward
broad boundaries for the applicability of review. 186 Second, it sets
out a standard, clear in wording if not application, that is apparently
applicable to NEPA. 1'5 Finally, the "paramount importance" analysis
of parkland lends credence to creation of a preferred status' 88
for the environment under NEPA.
As noted previously, the Eight Circuit was the first to specifically rule that "judicial review of substantive merits" was appropriate under NEPA. 8 9 It adopted the bifurcated Overton Park'90
test consisting of "scope of authority" followed by "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law." The court stated:
Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court, must first
determine if the agency reached its decision after a full,
good faith consideration and balancing of environmental -factors. The court must then determine, according to the standards set forth in §§ 101 (b) and 102 (1) of the Act, whether
'the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental
values. ' 9 '
The case was resolved at the appellate level by a decision that
the agency decision to proceed was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court emphasized that the project was 63% complete when
92
the action was instituted.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
1072
190.
191.
1072
192.

Id. at 416.
Id.
See text accompanying note 137, supra.
See text accompanying note 184, supra.
See note 128, supra.
EDF v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
(1973).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 P'.2d 289, 800 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
(1973).
Id. at 301.
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In a later case of a similar nature, the Eighth Circuit reiterated
its opinion on substantive review under NEPA. 19 The court held
that the appropriation of funds for the project by Congress after
the EIS was filed did not alter the nature or standard of judicial
19 4
review.
The above cases are important to the pending Garrison Diversion
litigation because they discuss the standard of substantive review
likely to be applied, and the method of its application. As compared
to the 63% completion figure of the previous case, Garrison Diversion
was less than 16% complete 9 5 when suit to halt construction was
filed. 96 It is also apparent that continued Congressional appropriation should not alter judicial review.
The Eighth Circuit's holdings on applicable standards of review
have been closely followed by several other circuits. Most recently,
97
the Seventh Circuit ignored its own prior dicta to the contrary
and drew heavily on EDF v. Corps 98 declaring that substantive
review under NEPA was obligatory. The court applied the bifurcated
Overton Park test iri declaring the agency action neither arbitrary
nor capricious. 9 9 The Fourth Circuit has expressly followed the
Eighth Circuit in relation to applicable standard of review.2 0
In considering substantive review the D.C. Circuit has stated:
The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive
decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown
that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck
clearly gave insufficient weight to environwas arbitrary 2or
01
mental values.
and agencies in a later
Considering the proper roles of courts
20 2
position.
its
reiterated
court
case, the
The Ninth Circuit quoted the above remarks with approval
in Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton. 203 However, earlier
193. EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1972).
194. The holding was based on Rule XXI of the House of Representatives which provides
that no provision in a continuing appropriation or amendment thereto changing existing law
shall be in order. L. Deschler, Manual and Rules of House of Representatives, 92d Cong.,
H.R. Doc. No. 439, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 464-65 (1971). The holding also referred to the
similar holding in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 469 F.2d 783, 785
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971), and the general rule against repeal by
implication.
195. In terms of dollar expenditures.
196. Brief for the Appellees at 4, Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, 476 F.2d 1284
(8th Cir. 1973).
197. Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537, 540 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972).
198. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
199. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973).
200. Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973).
201. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States A.E. Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
202. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
203. 471 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1978).
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NOTE

in that case, the court stated that its review was limited to whether
"the Secretary's action followed the necessary procedural requirements.1 20 4 In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the
Ninth Circuit set out the bifurcated Overton Park test as appropriate
for setting aside "agency action," but does so with respect to
review of the "substantive content of the EIS. ' 20 5 Thus it is probable, but not absolutely certain, that this circuit allows substantive
review of an agency decision to proceed.
The Fifth Circuit, in a case relating to judicial review of an
agency decision not to file an EIS, indicated that the "ultimate
merit decision . . . should be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard ....-20 Subsequent district
court decisions in the Fifth Circuit have acknowledged the requirement of substantive review.2 0 7 In a recent opinion from the Southern
District of Texas, the court followed the appellate court's dicta
in referring to the process as the "substantial inquiry test." The
court drew on Overton Park and stated:
As the Supreme Court remarked about the highway statutes,
the very existence of NEPA indicates that protection of the
environment was to be given paramount importance and
thus was not to be placed on an equal
footing with the usual
20 8
economic and technical factors.
The Second Circuit was among the first appellate courts to
consider judicial review under NEPA. In Scenic Hudson v. Federal
Power Commission the court adopted, the "substantial evidence"
test. This was defined as less than the weight of evidence. The
court stated that the possibility of a different conclusion being
reached on the same evidence does not make it impossible for
an agency's decision to be based on substantial evidence.2 0 9 Judge
Oakes dissented and suggested that review under the substantial
evidence was insufficient. He stated that the Federal Power Commission had acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion. 210 Unimpressed by the dissents, a district court in this circuit stated that
204. Id. at 1280. Some district courts of the Ninth Circuit have adopted the language of
the former case as controlling while another has followed the latter case.; Citizens v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269, 1275

(D.C. Ariz. 1973) ; EDF v. Armstrong, 856 F.

Supp. 131, 139

(N.D. Cal. 1973); as opposed to Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 274-76 (W.D. Wash.
1972).
205. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1973).
206. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
207. Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 531 (N.D. Ala. 1973) ; Sierra Club v. Lynn,
364 F. Supp. 834, 842 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
208. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1333 (S.D. Tex. 1973); compare with
Cohen, supra note 120, at 692-94.
209. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n., 453 F.2d 463, 467
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 927 (1972).
210. Id. at 482-84. Justice Douglas echoed these concernns In a dissent from denial of cert.
407 U.S. 927, 931 (1972).
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it was doubtful than an agency decision under NEPA was subject
to judicial review even under the substantial evidence or abuse
211
of discretion test.
The First Circuit recently paralleled the ruling of the Ninth
Circuit in describing judicial review of "findings and conclusion"
in an EIS by using the "arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion
or not in accordance with law" formula. 212 It seems apparent that
reviewing the "findings and conclusions ' 213 in an EIS is tantamount
to reviewing an agency decision to proceed, but this is not made
explicit by any reference to courts specifically authorizing the lat21 4
ter.
The Sixth Circuit has indicated the existence of the issue of
substantive review under NEPA, but has stated no opinion. 21 5 The
district courts of the Sixth Circuit which have considered the issue
under NEPA are reviewhave held that agency decisions to proceed
2 18
able under the Overton Park test.
Senator Jackson described NEPA in the following terms:
A statement of environmental policy is more than a
statement of what we believe as a people and as a nation.
,Itestablishes priorities2 and gives expression to our national
goals and aspirations. 17
NEPA has been described as an "Environmental Bill of Rights"
and legislation of a "constitutional character. 2 1 8 It has been suggested that NEPA creates a presumption in favor of the environment. 219 This suggestion has been given credence by Overton Park's
"paramount importance" of parkland analysis. 22 0 At least one court
environmental protection shall be given
has followed and stated that
"paramount importance. ' 2 2'
Judicial review of agency decisions is flexible in terms of depth
2 22
of inquiry. The more important the right, the sharper the review.
The Supreme Court, by analogy, and several of the circuit courts,
drectly, have indicated that in substantive review under NEPA,
they will inquire whether the agency decision was based on con211. City of N.Y. v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929, 939-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
212. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282. 1283 (1st Cir. 1973).
213.
d.
214. At the district court level in this circuit one court has specifically cited to such cases
in explicating the dicotorny of procedural and substantive review. Conservation Society of
Southern Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 632-33 (D. Vt. 1973).
215. EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
216. EDP v. TVA, No 1130 (E.D. Tenn., Mar. 21, 1973); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp.
1875, 1380 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
217. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969).
218. Hanks, supra note 117, at 230, 245-47.
219. Cohen, supra note 120,' at 694.
220. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971).
221. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1333 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
222. Sive, supra note 155, at 642.
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sideration of all relevant factors or was a clear error of judgment.
The Calvert Cliff's decision declared that the substantive portion
of NEPA requires agencies to reach the "optimally beneficial"
decision. 223 Given the "paramount importance" of the environment,

these requirements would seem a difficult hurdle; however, no
projects subject to substantive review have been halted solely on
failure to comply with the substantive portions of NEPA. Procedural
difficulties are generally called in to bolster the attempt to halt
the continuation of a project by injunction. It is not clear whether
this is due to the narrow scope of substantive review or judicial
reluctance to halt a project solely on substantive grounds.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fructification of American opposition to the Garrison Diversion Project in the legal arena is imminent. It seems clear
that the project will be subject to substantive review under Eighth
Circuit precedent. The record of this Circuit on major cases relating
to substantive review under NEPA is, from the Environmental
Defense Fund's point of view, a mediocre 0-1-1.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers224 the
22 5
court explicated the concept of substantive review under NEPA,
but on the basis of the record declared that the Corps was not
"arbitrary and capricious" in its decision to proceed with the project.2 2 6 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke,22 7 the court
reiterated its position on substantive review under NEPA 22 s and

remanded the case to the district court with instructions to subject
the agency decision to substantive review if such was promptly
requested by the plaintiff. 229 In the former case, the court balanced

project benefits against environmental values. The ten million dollars already expended, which would have been lost if the Gillham
project had been abandoned, and the fact that the project was
more than half complete when the suit was first filed were mentioned as factors considered in the balancing process.2 30 By comparison, the Garrison Diversion Project was less than sixteen per
cent complete and had cost almost sixty million dollars when suit
was first filed. 23 1 The international difficulties described

in this

223. 449 F.2d at 1112, 1123.
224. EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 P.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072
(1973).
225. Id. at 297-800.
226. Id. at 301.
227. 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
228. Id. at 852-53.
229. Id. at 356.
230. EDF v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 301 (8th ir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 1U.S. 1072
(1978).
231. Brief for the Appellees at 4, Committee to Save N.D., Inc. v. Morton, 476 F.2d 1284
(8th cir. 1978).
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note will be another input in the balancing process involved with
substantive review. The terms of NEPA require the inclusion of
28 2
this factor in the deliberations.
Current indications are that the Garrison Diversion Project will
not be halted by action in the political arena. It is likely that
sufficient appropriations to continue the project's advance will be
available from Congress at least in the near future. 2 3 However,
interntonal complications and questions as to the project's ability
to withstand the judicial scrutiny of substantive review under NEPA
indicate a prognosis which, if not critical, is at least serious.
ROBERT L. MANLEY
JEFFREY J.

PETERSON

232. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
Stat. 852, 854.
233. See Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 29, 1974, at 1, col. 5.

§ 102(2)(E),

83

